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record may not be known at the time of sentence. 34  And under
such statutes where a previous conviction is charged there must
be an allegation and proof of the previous conviction in order to
sentence the defendant under the statute, where he does not admit
the charge.35
In view of the recognized constitutionality of the habitual
criminal acts and their undoubted effectiveness as a deterrent
force, there appears to be no serious objection, either in law or in
policy, against their more widespread adoption and application.
Some provision, however, should be made to permit the judge
to exercise discretion, within limits, in imposing sentences in ex-
ceptional cases. The present provisions providing for the auto-
matic application of the increased punishment on proof of prior
crimes have resulted in a few cases in palpably disproportionate
punishment for a relatively trivial last offense. Such instances
have resulted in severe journalistic criticism and cannot but add
to the regrettable disrespect for the laws.
SAM ELSON, '30.
MENTAL INCAPACITY AS AFFECTING CONSENT TO
THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT
A voluntary consent to a contract of marriage by both parties
is a requisite to its validity., An insane person is not capable
of consent, and a marriage in which one of the parties is insane
is generally held to be void.2 By statute, however, in a number
of states such marriages are declared to be valid until adjudi-
cated a nullity-in other words, voidable.3 These statutes are
obviously in direct contravention of the common law and have
been severely criticized as involving a person in marriage with-
'See note, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 204, for procedure under habitual criminal
statutes.
"People v. King (1883), 64 Cal. 338, 30 P. 128.
'Wiley v. Wiley (1919), 75 Ind. A. 456, 123 N. E. 252; Rawdon v.
Rawdon (1856), 28 Ala. 565; Sims v. Sims (1897), 121 N. C. 297, 28 S. E.
407; Orchard v. Cofield (1897), 171 Ill. 14, 49 N. E. 197; Oswald v. Oswald
(Md., 1924), 126 A. 81.
'In re Gregorson (1911), 160 Cal. 21, 116 P. 60; Powell v. Powell (1877),
18 Kan. 371, 26 Am. Rep. 774; Orchard v. Cofield, supra; Grathering v.
Williams (1845), 27 N. C. 487; Williams v. Williams (1928), 83 Col. 180,
263 P. 725.
'Mich., Comp. Laws, 1915, sec. 11394; Mass., Gen. Laws, 1921, ch. 207,
sec. 6; N. D. Comp. Laws, 1913, 4373; Texas, Complete Stat., 1920, Civil
Code, Art. 4630; Vermont, Gen. Laws, 1917, sec. 3547, 3548; Wash., Reming-
ton's Comp. Stat., 1922, sec. 8449; W. Va., Hogg's Code, 1913, sec. 3636;
Ark., Craw. & Moses Dig., 1921, see. 2606-9; Ill., Hurd's Rev. Stat. 1921,
ch. 89, sec. 2; Ia., Code, 1897, see. 3182.
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out his consent.4  Some states have been so impressed by the
necessity of the existence of voluntary consent in a marriage
contract that provisions expressly declaring such consent a
requisite to its validity may be found among their statutes;5
yet a number of these same states have not hesitated to enact
laws expressly stipulating that marriages of persons incapable
of giving consent are to be regarded as voidable and not void,
and thereby have involved themselves in an apparent incon-
sistency.6
A void marriage is invalid for all purposes, except where
statutes have imposed limited validity by declaring the children
of such marriage legitimate, and may be attacked collaterally
by third parties; a voidable marriage, on the other hand, is valid
for all purposes until annulled in a direct proceeding for that
particular purpose.7 Whether a marriage by an insane person was
valid until annulled was a question not entirely settled at early
common law. It was, however, finally accepted and now pre-
vails as a generally-accepted view that such a marriage was
void, and needed no court decree to render it so., The thought
was persisted in by some, nevertheless, that for good order and
as a matter of propriety, a doubtful question of this sort ought
to be decided once and for all in a suit for a nullity decree and
not be left open for litigation between third parties. This view
in a limited sense prevails in North Carolina. It was held there
in the case of Williamson v. Williamson? that where both parties
were living, the marriage could not be considered void until it
was so adjudicated by a competent court. But even this limited
application cannot have effect where statutes exist declaring the
nullity of a marriage by an insane person independent of a court
decree to that effect. In view of the fact that an insane person
is incapable of consenting to the marriage contract, and that the
' Bishop, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION (1891), pp. 272-280.
'For example, R. S. Mo., 1919, sec. 7298. "Marriage is considered in law
as a civil contract to which the consent of the parties capable in law of con-
tracting is essential."
'Minn., Gen. Stat., 1913, sec. 7107 is exemplary.
'Keezer, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE (1923), sec. 165, and cases there cited.
* See cases cited in note 2, supra. This is the general rule in the absence
of statute making such marriages voidable.
' (N. C.), 3 Jones Eq. 446. Persons who claimed to be husband and
wife brought a bill in equity against the wife's guardian for an account;
and among other things they averred that the defendant relied on the fact
of a marriage which transpired between the wife and another man
previously to that of the plaintiffs, which prior marriage the bill proceeded
to allege was void by reason of insanity, making the present marriage valid.
The wife was compelled to resort to a direct suit to have the former mar-
riage decreed void.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol14/iss4/7
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
existence of insanity can be determined by the court in one type
of proceeding, either collateral or direct, and furthermore sincejudges are more capable of arriving at the truth than are juries,
it appears to be that the majority doctrine viewing such mar-
riages as void and subject to collateral attack at any time, is
much the sounder view and in reason the better conclusion of the
two.
Regardless, however, of whether such marriages are void or
voidable with their susceptibility to or immunity from collateral
attack, the question of the existence of insanity in a person suffi-
cient to render him incapable of consenting must at some time
be decided by the court. Insanity is not amenable to direct defi-
nition and rigid tests, and what constitutes insanity in rendering
a person incapable of a specific act is a perplexing question which
has caused the courts much difficulty. 10
In the case of Durham v. Durham,1 the court expounds the
generally recognized test, applicable in cases where a marriage
is sought to be annulled by one of the parties on the ground of
insanity, as a capacity in the person to understand the nature of
the contract and its duties and obligations. Perhaps a better
and more explicit statement of the test is found in Unity v. Bel-
grade :12 "The marriage was void if at the time it was con-
tracted, John had not sufficient mental capacity to understand
the nature of the marriage contract and [that] by it he became
the husband of Elizabeth and assumed all the duties, obligations
and responsibilities and all the rights growing out of the rela-
tion. He need not have understood all the duties and responsi-
bilities which the marriage relation imposed upon him, because
that rule would probably render void many marriages in this
state. But he should have had at the time sufficient mental
"°Durham v. Durham (1885), L. R. 10 Prob. Div. 80. "It is to be ob-
served, however, that this [test] only conceals for a moment the difficulty
of the inquiry, for I have still to determine the meaning to be attached to
the word understand. If I were to attempt to analyze this expression, I
should encounter the same difficulties at some other stage of the investiga-
tion with reference to some other phrase, and I should still have to de-
termine, on review of the whole fkcts whether the respondent came up to
the standard of sanity which I fix in my own mind, though I may not be
able to express it."
See note 10, supra.
(1884), 76 Me. 419; Schneider v. Rabb, supra; Kemmelick v. Kemmelick
(1921), 114 Misc. 198, 186 N. Y. S. 3; True v. Ranney (1850), 21 N. H.
52, 53 Am. Dec. 164; Ward v. Dulaney (1852), 23 Miss. 410; Lewis v. Lewis(1890), 44 Minn. 124, 46 N. W. 323; Dunphy v. Dunphy (1911), 161 Cal.
380, 119 P. 512; Waughop v. Waughop (1914), 82 Wash. 69, 143 P. 444;
Baffum v. Baffum (1916), 86 N. J. Eq. 119, 97 A. 256; Hempel v. Mempel(1921), 174 Wis. 332, 181 N. W. 749; Wiley v. Wiley, supra, note 1.
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capacity to enable him to understand the nature of the marriage
contract and to understand that upon himself he took with it
all the duties, obligations and responsibilities which the law
would impose upon him as a result of that contract on his part,
whatever they were." This test, like all tests of insanity, wheth-
er they be in a criminal case or an ordinary contract or will dis-
pute, is simply an attempt to introduce guides into a problem
which is in no way susceptible to definite limitations or cate-
gories. This test having been advanced, ive still have unsolved
the problem of what is insanity sufficient to render a marriage
a nullity. There is left for consideration the constituent ele-
ments of the marriage contract, the nature of which must be
within the understanding of the parties, as well as the difficult
definition of the word understanding as used in the above test.
It is true that there exist numerous degrees of insanity ranging
from complete idiocy and lunacy to weak intellect, and that a
person may be incompetent and irresponsible mentally for one
act or purpose and yet be perfectly competent and responsible
for another act or purpose. 13 Whether such degrees of insanity
will be recognized depends upon the particular branch of the
law as well as the subdivisions thereunder in which the par-
ticular case can be classified. The criminal law, for example,
recognizes but one degree of insanity, and it exists as a complete
defense or none at all.14 Thus, ultimately, it may be said that
the existence of insanity in a person is dependent upon the par-
ticular act, the obligations from which he seeks to escape or for
which he is sought to be charged, and upon the intelligence and
experience of the courts or body of men upon whom rests the
decision.
Courts have sought to introduce the capacity to contract or-
dinarily as the measure for the capacity necessary for consent
in a contract of marriage. There is little doubt that if such
capacity exists in the party pleading insanity, that capacity
sufficient for consent in a marriage contract likewise exists in
him. Some courts, however, have seen fit to proceed beyond that
point by requiring for the validity of a marriage a capacity
greater than that needed to contract concerning a person's prop-
' Handcock v. Peaty (1867), L. R. 1 Prob. Div. 335, 36 L. J. Prob. N. S.
57; Kinne v. Kinne (1831), 9 Conn. 102; Lowder v. Lowder (1877), 58 Ind.
538.
' People v. Leong Fook (Cal., 1928), 273 P. 779; People v. Troche (Cal.,
1928), 273 P. 676.
"S Kutch v. Kutch (1910), 88 Neb. 114, 129 N. W. 169. In Middleborough
v. Rochester (1815), 12 Mass. 363, it is stated: "One not having sufficient
understanding to be able to make a valid contract respecting property, or
to deal with discretion in the common affairs of life, cannot contract
matrimony."
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol14/iss4/7
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erty.18 In support of this view, it is argued that to permit a
lesser capacity to suffice for marriage than for a business con-
tract is to refuse a person the privilege of binding his property
by contract, and yet to permit this identical thing by allowing
him to bind himself in marriage. On the other hand this posi-
tion, it is claimed, results from a failure to grasp the true nature
of a marriage contract, and through the inability to distinguish
the contract from the consequences thereof; and that such a
contract is simple in its nature, consisting of a mutual under-
standing that the parties bind themselves in law to live together
as husband and wife.'7  It appears that this falls short of an-
swering fully the above contention. Consider the case of an old
man of weak intellect who is entirely incompetent to manage
his affairs, and who, in contemplation of marriage, enters into
an antenuptial agreement whereby he promises, in consideration
of marriage and of release of dower, to pay a sum of money.
Will he be allowed to evade the obligation of the agreement, and
yet be compelled to assume the same liability through the obliga-
tion imposed by law? Can it be said that this particular person
conceived of the marriage relationship as the simplest kind of
contract? It is difficult to see how an obligation, whether ex-
pressly stipulated or binding by operation of law, can be re-
garded as a consequence and not the contract itself. Marriage
has been said to be a status, the extent of which is defined by
law. Legislatures have found it necessary to impose obligations
and duties upon insurance companies in making contracts of in-
surance. 8 It is recognized everywhere that such statutory
terms, as well as the common law, are as much a part of the
contract as the expressed terms of the policy.19 Marriage be-
ing an agreement to assume a relationship or status, it must
necessarily follow that property obligations, which are as much
a part of that status as is the duty of fidelity, cannot be regarded
as something distinct from the status itself. While the answer
" Handcock v. Peaty, supra, note 13. Turner v. Meyers (1808), 151 Eng. Re-
prints 600; "And it may be added that if any contract more than another
is capable of being invalidated on the ground of insanity of either of the
contracting parties, it should be the contract of marriage, an act by which
the parties bind their property and their persons for the rest of their lives."
See also Atkins v. Medford (1859), 46 Me. 510.
"Bishop, MAIuIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION, pp. 258, 259.
" De Lancey v. Insurance Co. (1873), 52 N. H. 581; Ritter v. Insurance
Co. (1896), 169 U. S. 139; Sulphur Mines Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (1897),
94 Va. 355, 26 S. E. 856.
" Pietri v. Sequenat (1902), 96 Mo. A. 258, 69 S. W. 1055; Union Cent.
Life Ins. Co. v. Pollard (1896), 94 Va. 146, 26 S. E. 421; N. Y. Life Ins.
Co. v. Fletcher (1886), 117 U. S. 519; Brady v. Ins. Co. (1863), 11 Mich.
425; Oshkosh Gaslight Co. v. Germania Fire Ins. Co. (1888), 71 Wis. 454.
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to the contention of the minority argument lies in the simplicity
of the marriage contract, its nature cannot logically be deter-
mined by a separation of some of the obligations from the con-
tract as consequences. The majority holding, which is ex-
pressed in a multitude of cases, that a lesser mental capacity than
that necessary in the ordinary commercial contract will suffice
for a contract of marriage, has for its foundation the acceptance
of the nature of a marriage contract as a mutual pledge to live
together as man and wife to the exclusion of all others. 20  The
nature of the contract cannot logically be said to be so simple,
and yet the courts have found that its acceptance as such fits the
layman's conception, and as a matter of public expediency is
necessary. This view impresses one even more favorably when
it is considered that the sane party is competent to have his
marriage declared a nullity when the other party can be ad-
judged insane, where such a marriage is held to be void2l and,
in some states, where such marriages are considered voidable. 22
While the courts have now generally accepted the contract of
marriage as the simplest kind of an agreement, they have yet
to arrive at like adjudications as to the existence of sufficient
understanding in the parties when confronted with substantially
similar facts and circumstances. An Illinois court decided that
a want of mental capacity existed sufficient to invalidate the
apparent consent in a wealthy man seventy-two years of age who
clandestinely married a woman of ill-repute.2 3 A Nebraska
court found sufficient mental capacity for valid consent in a
man seventy years of age who advanced the claim of senile
dementia, and who four years after the marriage was unques-
tionably insane.2 4  These cases have, with some minor varia-
tions, similar facts, and yet their decisions are in direct oppo-
sition. The courts have been moved by a consideration of con-
sequences in a number of cases, and they have felt inclined to
protect people of little intellect against those who have obviously
taken advantage of their condition, 2 or to recognize the chief
" In re Guthery (1920), 205 Mo. A. 664, 226 S. W. 626; Hagenson v.
Hagenson (1913), 258 Ill. 197, 101 N. E. 606; Adams v. Scott (1913), 93
Neb. 537, 141 N. W. 148; Montgomery v. U'Nertle (Md., 1923), 122 A.
357; Schneider v. Rabb (Tex., 1906), 100 S. W. 163; Aldrich v. Steen
(1904), 71 Neb. 33, 98 N. W. 445; Rawdon v. Rawdon, supra; Nonnemacher
v. Nonnemacher (1894), 159 Pa. St. 634, 28 A. 439.
'See note 2, supra.
See note 3, supra.
- See Pyott v. Pyott (1901), 191 11. 280, 61 N. E. 88.
'Aldrich v. Steen, note 20, supra.
' Kutch v. Kutch, note 15, supra. "If it should be hard that the issue of such
marriages should be deemed bastards, it would be as much so that human
beings without reason, or their family should be the victims of artifice of
desperate persons who might be willing to speculate on their misfortunes."
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol14/iss4/7
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purpose of marriage to be that of procreation of healthy chil-
dren.26 Whatever may be the considerations of this type, they,
from a logical point of view, can have no effect or bearing upon
the existence of insanity; a person of weak mind may be im-
posed upon in contracting marriage, and yet be perfectly capable
mentally of being a party to this relatively simple contract where
usually the desire to drive a "sharp bargain" is completely
lacking.
While this objection seems well-taken, it is equally easy to com-
prehend the necessity of considering the consequences of a par-
ticular decision before rendering one. Perhaps these considera-
tions have found expression where the courts have stated that
each case is to be decided upon its own particular facts.
FRANK E. MATHEWS, '30.
See article in 27 CoL. L. REv. 845.
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